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ABSTRACT 
The rise and fall of policies regulating early exit from labour markets remains en-
igmatic for comparative politics. Most explanations focus on structural or institu-
tional causes. A missing source of national variation, this discussion paper 
argues, lies in cross-country differences in voters’ attitude. Whereas in some 
European countries voters would not think that there is a trade-off between the 
employment of older and younger workers, in others this is a dominant paradigm. 
I describe these differences in opinion, as well as their potential and limits for 
explaining reform in this policy area. A multi-level analysis of Eurobarometer data 
shows that low employment rates and high levels of labour market regulation lead 
more people to believe in such a trade-off. This belief is rather the result of vot-
ers’ perceptions of how labour markets work than the result of their personal 
situation. 
 
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft fällt es schwer, den Aufstieg und Nieder-
gang von Politiken, die das vorzeitige Ausscheiden aus dem Erwerbsleben 
bestimmen, zu verstehen. Die meisten Erklärungen hierzu ziehen strukturelle 
oder institutionelle Ursachen heran. In diesem Diskussionspapier wird argumen-
tiert, dass eine fehlende Quelle nationaler Variation in unterschiedlichen Einstel-
lungen von Wählern liegt. Während in manchen europäischen Ländern Wähler 
nicht an einen Zielkonflikt zwischen der Beschäftigung älterer und jüngerer Ar-
beitnehmer glauben, ist dies in anderen ein starkes Paradigma. Ich skizziere die 
Unterschiede in den Meinungen und diskutiere, inwiefern sie zur Erklärung von 
Reformprozessen beitragen. Eine Mehrebenenanalyse von Eurobarometerdaten 
zeigt, dass niedrige Beschäftigungsraten und hoher Kündigungsschutz eher 
Menschen dazu bringen, an diesen Zielkonflikt zu glauben. Der Glaube an den 
Zielkonflikt ist weniger das Resultat der tatsächlichen, persönlichen Situation der 
Wähler, als vielmehr ein Produkt dessen, wie Menschen die Funktionsweise des 
Arbeitsmarktes wahrnehmen. 
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1. Introduction 
After decades of rising early exit, labour force participation among older workers 
is again on the increase in most OECD countries. Policy-makers in many coun-
tries have begun to curtail early exit programmes (EEPs) and have increased the 
statutory retirement age. For international organizations such as the OECD or the 
EU, ‘active ageing’ is nowadays a priority issue. The normative properties of this 
policy reversal remain a controversial topic. Analytically, the reversal is enigmatic 
since it prompts the question why some countries have maintained or actually 
extended these programmes longer than others. This question is the reverse of 
the ‘paradoxical’ trend towards increasing early exit in societies despite the 
demographic changes they face. Both the rise and the recent fall of EEPs have 
attracted much research, but it is still difficult to give definite answers.  
One of the reasons is that early exit policies are, by their very nature, multidimen-
sional and interdependent. There are many functional equivalents to explicit pro-
grammes designed for early retirement, among them disability schemes, lowering 
regular pension age, or long-term unemployment benefits for older workers. 
Therefore, Kohli et al. (1991: 6) speak of EEPs more generally, as equivalent to 
‘pathways of exit’, i.e., ‘…a combination of different institutional arrangements 
that are sequentially linked to manage the transition process, that is, the period 
between exit from work and entry into the normal old-age pension system.’ This 
definition is not without caveats, since there is no such thing as a ‘normal’ old-age 
pension system. Ultimately, policy reversal can only be defined implicitly as a 
policy outcome, such as the decreasing incidence of early exit below a particular 
age such as 65. While I am aware that it is dangerous to ascribe policies high 
causal power with respect to early exit, I abide by this perspective for the lack of 
better alternatives.1 
Using this broad notion of EEPs, politicians can expect to influence behaviour of 
workers only by adopting broad policy packages affecting several areas at once. 
For social scientists this means that EEP reform covers a large area and that 
there are accordingly many approaches to explaining policy changes. Two ex-
treme cases are institutionalist accounts and political economy considerations. 
Whereas the former have pointed to the role of path dependency in national re-
gimes, the latter focus mainly on the aggregation of heterogeneous political inter-
ests concerning EEPs. Given that institutions are much more stable than interest 
coalitions, it can be said – in somewhat simplified terms – that institutionalism 
                                            
1   Nevertheless, there is some evidence that institutional variables such as the replace-
ment rate of social transfer programmes and the implicit tax rates for postponing re-
tirement drive the decision to exit the labour market early (Blöndal and Scarpetta 
1999). 
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tends to underestimate the likelihood of change, whereas political economy ap-
proaches overestimate it. One way of combining these approaches in a fruitful 
manner is to introduce a missing link: the role of voters’ causal beliefs in the re-
form process.  
Causal beliefs in the efficacy of policies have been intensively studied by com-
parative analysts of welfare state policy (Schmidt 2002), but – to the best of my 
knowledge – it has never been applied to EEPs. In this article, I show that it is a 
particular version of a belief that steers voters’ perceptions, the so-called lump of 
labour fallacy. Moreover, I do not ascribe a stand-alone causal power to beliefs, 
since I also outline a rationale why electorates in different countries hold different 
beliefs. In a nutshell, strongly regulated labour markets with high levels of EEPs 
face the twin predicament of high unemployment and low employment. Where 
this is the case, this co-evolution makes it difficult for voters to see how enhanc-
ing employment will lower unemployment. Hence, voters systematically oppose 
any policy that increases the labour supply.  
The next section reviews the state of the art in the literature on EEP reforms. 
Section 3 explains the lump-of-labour fallacy in more detail and shows how it re-
lates to aggregate data. In section 4 I present evidence that some people are 
more inclined to believe in fixed lumps of labour than others, and I discuss the 
micro-level causes of this belief. I test my results against Eurobarometer data. 
Section 5 argues that this belief is a consequence of both the structural condi-
tions and the institutions that regulate the labour market in a country. For this 
purpose, I extend the micro-level regressions of section 4 by macro-level covari-
ates. The last section concludes. 
2. The Causes of Policy Reform in Early Exit  
Programmes (EEPs) 
Since the issue of policy reform in EEPs is complex, it is no wonder that scholars 
have adopted many different perspectives in explaining why a reform has taken 
place in a given country or not. To keep matters simple, I distinguish between five 
broad classes of approach: (1) functionalist arguments, (2) the role of voters, (3) 
the role of parties and interest groups, (4) the role of political institutions, and (5) 
the role of regimes and paths. 
A genuine starting point is to presume that problem pressure is a determinant of 
policy reform. Reforms, in this view, fulfil the function of mitigating or abolishing 
problems that are predominantly economic in nature. In this perspective, EEPs 
are usually seen as very costly, especially in PAYG pension systems, since they 
reduce revenues and increase outlays. Indeed, there is a strong positive correla-
tion between low employment rates for workers between 55 and 64 and unit la-
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bour costs in a country (Herbertsson and Orszag 2003;OECD 2006). Several 
causes may be involved, and pension systems vary across countries, but it 
strongly reminds us that EEPs have by no means been cheap. Yet problem pres-
sure does not clarify much, since the average effective retirement age has 
dropped in the last four decades, although demographic change requires a rising 
retirement age to keep the public budget balanced (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999). 
Therefore, cross-country variance in the reduction of effective retirement age 
prompts suspicions that political rather than efficiency concerns have steered the 
reform process.  
A simple political economy approach usually starts with  a notion of voter hetero-
geneity and how it affects public policy outcomes. Hence, differences in reforming 
EEPs may be due to differences in national electorates. Older people, for in-
stance, may want to maintain EEPs for various reasons (Lazear 1979). They do 
not have to bear the burden of intergenerational redistribution (Sinn and Übel-
messer 2002). They also tend to be overrepresented in the electorate, since 
turnout increases with age (Goerres 2007). Moreover, some national electorates 
may be more hostile to policy reform than others. For example, Iversen and 
Soskice (2001) argue that the more specific and the less portable workers’ skills 
are, the more they depend on the existence of public insurance schemes in the 
event of job loss. There is no direct test of these theories of self-interest and the 
political behaviour of individuals in the realm of EEPs. For other labour market 
policies Rehm (2005) finds a direct effect of a voters’ exposure to occupational 
unemployment risk on the desired level of labour market policy. Given the bewil-
dering complexity of EEPs, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine a direct link be-
tween voters’ material interests and their preferences for or against EEPs (cf. 
below). 
If one adds political parties to the explanation, certain patterns emerge. Though 
partisan preferences for EEPs cannot be straightforwardly allocated, many sig-
nificant increases in exits from the labour force have occurred in countries where 
Christian democratic parties have been in power.2 In contrast, social democratic 
or (European-style) liberal parties do not exhibit any relationship with early exit. 
This is to be expected, since it has been argued that left-wing parties actively 
seek high employment, whereas liberal parties do not want to intervene in the 
private decision whether to work or not (Esping-Andersen 1990). Christian de-
mocrats, in contrast, seem to use EEPs in times of labour market crises more 
frequently. They were part of a more general strategy of Christian democrats to 
respond to job losses by reducing the labour supply (Armingeon 1999). And yet, 
the relationship between the colour of government and EEPs is clearly over-
determined, since dominant political ideologies also tend to correlate with other 
types of welfare institutions (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
                                            
2   A simple correlation analysis between the average share of cabinet seats hold by 
Christian democratic parties between 1950 and 1990 and the incidence of early exit 
as measured in figure 2 shows a reasonably strong and negative correlation. 
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As for the interest group approach, many researchers have maintained that con-
tinental European corporatist systems are particularly prone to a higher incidence 
of early exit (Ebbinghaus 2006). ‘Labour shedding’ in times of economic turbu-
lence or restructuring is to the benefit of both employers’ associations and trade 
unions, if they do not represent all voters equally. In this case, smaller but power-
ful segments of the population can externalize the costs of EEPs to all tax payers 
(Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). In a comparative perspective, it is difficult to pre-
determine which corporatist or wage-bargaining structure leads to such ‘insider’ 
behaviour, since many organizational traits shape the representativeness of in-
dustrial partners (Kittel 2003).3 Moreover, there is also an alternative view about 
industrial partners that puts them in a much better light. The existence of so-
called social pacts enhances the capacity of a state to reform welfare state poli-
cies (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). This theoretical ambiguity about the role of 
industrial partners is also visible empirically. Collusion between employers and 
trade unions played a key role in creating EEPs, but it also helped in reducing 
them (Ebbinghaus 2006). From a static perspective, there seems to be a differ-
ence between sectoral bargaining systems such as Germany, Austria or the 
Netherlands and fully centralized systems such as Sweden or Norway. And yet, 
the evaluation of this claim differs over time. Although the Dutch still face prob-
lems with containing EEPs and early exit, the record has improved throughout the 
last decade without any significant changes in the formal involvement of corpo-
rate actors.  
Similar caveats apply to including political institutions in the narrative. There is 
some evidence that systems with multiple veto players are slower with regard to 
EEPs than the international trend against such programmes. Germany may be an 
interesting case, since EEPs have proved to be very difficult to change owing to 
formal veto players such as an opposition party dominating the second chamber 
(König 2001;Zohlnhöfer 2001). Other researchers are, however, more sceptical 
about the role of veto institutions in EEP reform (Immergut, Anderson, and 
Schulze 2006).  
A final explanation for reform is in terms of institutional arrangements or regimes 
defined as systems of (complementary) relationships between (policy) institutions 
such as the wage-bargaining system, employment protection legislation or the 
pension system. Many comparative political scientists believe that the role played 
by specific institutional arrangements in contemporaneous welfare states is so 
important that reform processes are not coherent across countries (e.g. Scharpf 
2000). Welfare states evolve along specific paths that differ from country to coun-
try. These national paths also emerge if policies develop their own dynamics, 
frequently as unintended consequences of some previous political decision. This 
argument has been applied to the case of EEPs (Ebbinghaus 2006). For such an 
                                            
3   There is some positive relationship however, between bargaining coverage as a 
measure of the leverage of social partners and the extent of early retirement (Hart-
lapp and Kemmerling 2007).  
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argument, however, a deeper theoretical underpinning is crucial, since otherwise 
an analytic distinction between cause and effect is blurred. In analysing the wel-
fare state, there is good cause to believe that EEPs are difficult to reform if , for 
instance, institutions create their own political clientele opposed to abolition of the 
policy (Pierson 2004;Saint-Paul 2000). Nevertheless, we need to know more 
about why and under what circumstances such political bias arises. For political 
economists, the question is far from trivial. In principle, EEPs should be easy to 
abolish if a two-tiered system is proposed. Such systems maintain the status quo 
for older generations (who hold veto powers), but change it for younger cohorts.  
In simple terms, these alternative explanations can be summarized as follows. 
Whereas political economy approaches overestimate the likelihood of change, 
institutionalist approaches underestimate it. An approach that seeks to reconcile 
the two takes account of how people learn how modern labour markets function. 
3. Voters’ Beliefs and Lumps of Labour 
Processes of learning and belief formation, based on previous experience, is one 
way of explaining policy persistence and policy change (Braun and Gilardi 2006). 
More and more scholars subscribe to the view that a thorough understanding of 
welfare state reform requires an analysis of the role of ideas. Schmidt (2002), for 
instance, argues that the way the Lubbers government in the Netherlands engi-
neered the political discourse on welfare state adjustment was decisive for its 
relative success compared to Germany. Likewise, Cox (2001) argues that the 
debate on globalisation was more controversial in Germany than in the Nether-
lands and Denmark. Though these claims are highly insightful, it is not so easy to 
assess their empirical leverage. For instance, account must be taken not only of 
the the fact that a large country like Germany discusses globalisation differently-
but also of many other aspects, not all of them are of ‘constructivist’ in nature. 
Germany has a larger and more heterogeneous population and also greater 
weight in the world economy. While its size suggests that preference aggregation 
might be more difficult , its economic clout makes the acceptance of change less 
likely. Both hypotheses have some merit, but offer entirely different explanatory 
perspectives on policy reform. Neither is it always clear how discursive or idea-
tional factors relate to standard explanations. Frequently they provide for different 
narrations, but not necessarily new ones (Blyth 1997). Hence, we must consider 
what kind of beliefs we expect to matter and in what way. 
In their analysis of the power of ideas for foreign policy-making, Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993) distinguish between world views, principled beliefs and causal 
beliefs. Whereas world views and principled beliefs deal with broader concepts 
such as values, norms and ideologies, causal beliefs are ‘cause-effect relation-
ships’ (p. 10). In a similar way I am interested in voters’ beliefs in how labour 
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markets work and the implications for voters’ attitudes on early retirement. Policy-
makers may share these beliefs, acting in concordance with voters, but this is not 
the main gist of my argument. Instead, voters’ beliefs as part of their preference 
formation will have an impact on political reforms, if politicians’ fear to act against 
public opinion. Case studies on welfare state reform are full of examples of politi-
cians shying away from certain policy options even if they themselves believed in 
the usefulness of these options.  
In the case of EEPs I suggest a particular kind of belief. Voters may believe that 
there is an upper limit to the total number of jobs in a society, and that this upper 
limit may fall due to globalisation and technological change. Some economists 
call this argument the lump-of-labour fallacy (Krugman 1999). It has a rather long 
history. In the early 19th century, the Luddite social movement protested violently 
against the introduction of knitting machines (Polanyi 1944). Marxism popularized 
the idea that people fired in some sector remain unemployed or decrease wages 
in other sectors to the point of pauperisation. Modern versions of the argument 
that ‘the modern economy’ inherently destroys jobs and produces fewer new 
ones can be found in the writings of Jeremy Rifkin (1994).  
I think that this belief, in a less articulate version, haunts many national labour 
markets. From the perspective of an employed person/ voter this makes a lot of 
sense, if he or she cannot move quickly to other economic sectors or regions. 
Under such circumstances, workers will perceive high unemployment as a direct 
threat. Since they doubt the causal connection between more labour supply and 
more employment, they are more likely to resist reforms that intend to increase 
labour supply. The reduction of EEPs is such a policy reform. Under these cir-
cumstances it is difficult for voters to understand the need to reform EEPs. Neo-
classic economists, of course, would argue that a dynamic economy will always 
create new jobs and that a constant or shrinking number of jobs is, at best, a sec-
toral but not an aggregate phenomenon (Krugman 1999). This argument has not 
remained uncontested, however, since it usually takes quite a time for a positive 
shock of labour supply to enhance employment (Carlin and Soskice 2005).  
It is therefore an interesting question beyond the scope of this paper. Neverthe-
less, an attempt can be made to gauge its validity in a highly stylized way: a sim-
plistic operationalisation consists of investigating the trade-off between older and 
younger workers across countries. Aggregate unemployment rates can be plotted 
against employment rates of men aged between 55 and 64. I intentionally con-
centrate on male employment rates, since most EEPs were tailored for male 
workers in the manufacturing sector (Kohli and Rein 1991).4 Figure 1, panels a 
and b, shows the results for the years 1983 and 2003. It is clear that conventional 
story about the rise and fall of EEPs has some empirical merits. The gist of this 
                                            
4   As the OECD (2006: 29) notes labour market participation of older and younger 
women is very similar. Hence, the cross-country gender pattern is more of a general 
nature and probably not due to EEPs. 
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story is that most governments, trying to fix high unemployment in the 1970s, 
recurred to EEPs, since they were in line with popular demand, backed by both 
employers and employees and expected to relieve tension on the labour market. 
According to cross-country data (cf. figure 1), this strategy did, at least, not pro-
duce adverse short-run effects . Although, as the line shows, the trend is slightly 
negative , it is not significant in a statistical sense (r = -0.25). Given its high popu-
larity at the time, governments were tempted not only to maintain but even to 
increase EEPs. It played little role then that EEPs did not achieve their major 
goal, i.e., reducing unemployment by making room for other (especially young) 
workers.  
Figure 1 (panels a and b):  The relationship between employment and  
unemployment 
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The picture changed drastically within the next twenty years, as panel b shows. In 
2003 there was a strong and statistically significant negative relationship between 
unemployment and employment rates (r = -0.58). To be sure, this graph does not 
imply any causality, and the sample size has increased. Yet, whereas more and 
more men exited the labour market early, unemployment rates went up rather 
than down. Nowadays, countries with high unemployment also have the highest 
incidence of early exit. The least one can deduce, therefore, is that EEPs were  
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not particularly successful in alleviating tension in labour markets and that cross-
country evidence gives little reason to believe in the fallacy. But this macroeco-
nomic bird’s eye perspective is not the pool of information the average voter taps. 
4. Micro-Level Evidence for EU Countries 
The link between public opinion and welfare state policies has been intensively 
debated among scholars. Some studies simply assume a link between individual 
policy preferences and policy output (Iversen and Soskice 2001). Others try to 
measure the direct impact of public opinion on policy outputs such as social ex-
penditure (Brooks and Manza 2006), but these attempts have not remained un-
contested (Myles 2006). Moreover, in discussions on the determinants of political 
reform, the question remains whether beliefs are really independent variables. It 
is likely, for instance, that beliefs become more polarized if politicians are already 
undertaking initial steps in controversial measures. It is then hard to know if be-
liefs describe this process or explain it. For the purpose of this paper, my aim is 
hence more modest. I treat empirical evidence on beliefs as an ‘intermediate’ 
source of information that yields (additional) clues about the links between 
causes and effects, but I also try to describe the determinants of these beliefs. 
This is in contrast to Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 7) who concentrate on the 
mere effects of ideas. In my view, such a research strategy makes it difficult to 
tell whether beliefs mark real differences or mere epiphenomena. I consider it 
better to reason about the origins of different beliefs among voters or politicians if 
we are to understand their causal power.  
Needless to say, it is impossible to discover true beliefs or preferences directly, 
so that the fundamental problem is how to test a claim on beliefs. Empirically, 
public opinion is so volatile that cross-temporal variation is difficult to explain. 
Moreover, national ‘frames’ and structural differences make it very difficult to 
compare cross-country means of aggregate populations (Druckman 2001). 
Therefore, aggregate analyses of such data have to be interpreted with caution. 
Most importantly for our purposes, there is no direct operationalization of the be-
lief in a lump-of-labour fallacy at hand that holds across countries. A reasonable 
proxy is to use Eurobarometer data. Table 1 depicts responses to two similar 
questions in the surveys of 1992 and 2001.5 People were asked whether they  
 
                                            
5   The questions were: ‘People in their 50s should give up work to make way for 
younger people’ (EB 37.1, question 42.2) and ‘People in their late 50s should give up 
work to make way for younger and unemployed people’ (EB 56.1, question 68.1). 
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Table 1: Public Opinion on the Trade-Off between Older and  
Younger Workers 
People in their 50s should make way… 
 2001 1992 
 Yes No Don’t Know Yes No Don’t Know 
Austria 7.20 55.50 7.30 . . . 
Belgium 66.28 24.42 9.30 38.15 58.21 3.64 
Denmark 23.38 75.53 1.10 31.50 67.70 0.80 
Finland 38.71 58.28 3.01 . . . 
France 69.56 26.05 4.39 29.91 67.20 2.89 
Germany (W) 50.10 43.00 6.90 27.59 68.93 3.49 
Germany (E) 59.86 34.79 5.35 24.58 73.24 2.18 
Great Britain 20.53 71.57 7.91 26.50 71.51 1.98 
Greece 90.84 7.27 1.89 44.30 49.30 6.40 
Ireland 28.51 61.95 9.54 26.70 67.70 5.60 
Italy 72.17 22.07 5.75 33.74 62.42 3.84 
Luxembourg 71.67 25.83 2.50 30.13 66.67 3.21 
Northern Ireland 24.34 69.41 6.25 . . . 
Netherlands 31.31 63.92 4.77 22.35 75.55 2.10 
Portugal 78.02 16.68 5.29 50.80 47.29 1.90 
Spain 72.70 20.10 7.20 34.80 58.90 6.30 
Sweden 50.90 46.60 2.50 . . . 
Total 52.12 42.53 5.35 32.39 64.20 3.41 
Source: Eurobarometer 37.1 and 56.1 
strongly or slightly agree or disagree with the statement that older workers should 
make way for younger workers entering the labour market. I recoded those who 
(dis-)agreed strongly or slightly into one category. The table shows two important 
things. First, there is a pronounced difference between 1992 and 2001. In the 
latter survey many more people tended to agree with the statement. This may be 
for two reasons: either the ‘discourse’ in many countries has heated up over the 
nine years; or the wording has had a strong impact on responses, since only the 
second survey explicitly mentions the unemployed as potential beneficiaries.6 
Secondly, despite temporal variation, the table shows differences between coun-
try: in the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands the rejection of the statement al-
ways dominates, whereas in other countries public opinion is much more divided 
on the issue. 
                                            
6   Of course, there are several additional problems with the use of these data. For in-
stance, the wording is inherently normative (‘should make way’) so that it only indi-
rectly reveals a causal belief in a trade-off between older and younger workers. 
  10 
Given the problematic nature of aggregate opinion data, I proceed to some of the 
micro-level implications of the argument. For this purpose I use the 2001 survey, 
which dealt with the future of pension systems, and calculate logit regressions for 
all available countries (Table 2). 
I distinguish between several types of independent variable. A first group reveals 
information about the individual situation of respondents such as age, income 
and employment status. According to the literature, workers closer to retirement 
should favour early exit and hence agree with the question. There may also be a 
non-linear relationship, since older people, e.g., pensioners, do not need to share 
this wish.7 More affluent people should be more likely to reject the proposition if 
the standard microeconomic argument about rising opportunity costs is valid, i.e., 
people with higher wages have less interest in leisure (Becker 1976). The relative 
income position is difficult to measure, since many people do not want to state 
their income. More respondents give information on how they relate to a given 
reference income, so the following regressions use this indicator of income. I also 
include some control variables such as size of community, level of education and 
information on party membership to allow for the fact that not all respondents are 
equally well informed about the question. I also include gender to find out 
whether there was truly a male bias among those who agreed with the statement. 
Finally, an interest-based approach expects unemployed people to be more likely 
to agree than others.  
A second group of variables entails information on the socio-economic environ-
ment of respondents. In the survey there is only one question suitable for these 
purposes (no. 18.8): ‘Over half of my friends are unemployed.’ A positive rela-
tionship should prevail if people form their attitudes not only on the basis of their 
own situation, but also on the basis of their personal environment. This variable is 
important, since beliefs usually do not arise merely from personal experience, but 
they do not necessarily depend on macro conditions in the labour market, either. 
Therefore, such a ‘meso-level’ variable addresses the role of groups in an analy-
sis that is usually dominated by macro or micro-level approaches. 
A third group of variables includes other attitudes that are potentially related and 
comply with other claims found in the literature. First, it is interesting to investi-
gate whether agreement with the statement relates to the self positioning of re-
spondents on a political left-right scale. Next, according to the literature on 
industrial partners, there is a positive relationship between question no. 44.13 
(‘…workers need strong trade unions’) and the dependent variable. Third, I add 
question 67.09: ‘More foreigners should be allowed to work in (OUR 
COUNTRY)….’ If the argument about causal beliefs is true, people who reject  
 
                                            
7   One reason to expect a non-linear relationship between age and the attitude towards 
early retirement is that workers may be risk averse and older workers are more likely 
to be better informed about their employment opportunities, given their past experi-
ence. 
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Table 2: Micro-Level Determinants of Public Opinion 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Individual-level variables    
Gender -0.04 -0.12 -0.10 
 (0.94) (1.64) (1.30) 
Education -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (2.71)*** (3.88)*** (3.43)*** 
Size of Community -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
 (6.22)*** (3.58)*** (3.50)*** 
Personal Situation    
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (2.83)*** (1.64) (1.64) 
Age^4 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (2.85)*** (2.85)*** (2.55)** 
Lower, equal or higher income  -0.08 -0.08 
  (1.55) (1.48) 
Party member? -0.08 0.19 0.16 
 (1.02) (1.46) (1.17) 
Unemployed in last 5 years? 0.21 0.14 0.14 
 (3.78)*** (1.49) (1.38) 
Social Environment    
Half of my friends are unemployed? 0.37 0.34 0.33 
 (4.93)*** (2.13)** (1.99)** 
Related Attitudes:    
Necessary to have a good job? 0.10 0.26 0.28 
 (1.48) (2.29)** (2.31)** 
Workers don’t need strong trade  -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 
unions? (5.21)*** (3.43)*** (2.77)*** 
Foreigners shouldn’t work here? 0.04 0.08 0.04 
 (2.12)** (2.42)** (1.10) 
Left - right self positioning  0.02 0.02 
  (0.87) (1.07) 
Satisfaction with Job Security?  -0.03 -0.05 
  (1.40) (2.09)** 
Endogenous Attitudes:    
Ageing as a major problem?   0.15 
   (2.60)*** 
Duty to finance the elderly?   -0.01 
   (0.25) 
Raise retirement age?   0.35 
   (8.47)*** 
Constant 1.05 1.42 0.28 
 (0.67) (0.72) (0.07) 
Number of Observations 11556 4324 3993 
Country fixed effects √ √ √ 
Log likelihood -6607.7686 -2465.8412 -2231.114 
Pseudo R^2 0.169 0.177 0.194 
Dependent variable is belief in the trade-off in 2001(cf. text); absolute value of z statistics 
in parentheses, country fixed effects omitted  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  12 
this statement also believe more strongly in a trade-off in the labour market. 
Hence, in this view, restricting immigration and enhancing early exit are two simi-
lar ways of reducing the labour supply and should therefore be correlated. Both 
the variable on the importance of unions and on the issue of foreigners are in-
versely coded, so that negative signs mean higher agreement with the statement. 
I add two opinions on the necessity of having a good job and personal satisfac-
tion with job security. The later directly captures the effects of the perceived risk 
of losing a job on the belief in a trade-off between older and younger workers. 
Finally, there are three further questions on attitudes that are highly similar to our 
dependent variable. One (q. 62.01) asks respondents whether they believe in a 
duty to finance the elderly, another (q. 66) whether they conceive ageing to be an 
important social problem, and a third (q. 67.03) whether respondents think it is 
necessary to raise the retirement age. Whereas the first two control for a sense of 
obligation for the elderly and the salience of the problem, the last links the atti-
tude about the trade-off with the attitude on a direct question on policy prefer-
ences. Hence, the latter is surely not exogenous in a strict sense, but vital in 
understanding the extent to which our dependent variable is politically relevant. 
I use a simple logit model, in which the dependent variable is 1 for ‘strongly 
agree/ slightly agree’ and 0 for ‘slightly disagree/ strongly disagree.’8 Table 2 re-
ports three different models for a pooled sample of 17 countries.9 The first model 
uses a reduced set of regressors which allows for the highest number of included 
observations. The second model adds some regressors, for which coverage is 
not as high, and the third includes information on attitudes which are likely to be 
endogenous to the dependent variable. All three models include dummy vari-
ables for each country (not reported) to account for unobserved country factors. 
Since pooling national survey data is not unproblematic, I reran all regressions for 
each section separately (not reported) to look for significant country differences.  
Although the number of observations drops by almost two thirds going from 
model (1) to (3), most results remain fairly stable.10 The inclusion of section dum-
mies is necessary, but most coefficients remain stable even in models without 
them. The personal situation is, as expected, highly relevant. Respondents with 
longer education and living in larger towns are more likely to reject the statement. 
Gender is significant in only some countries, but with opposing signs. Party 
membership does not play a role, either. The probability of agreeing with the 
 
                                            
8   ‘Don’t know’ was coded as missing value. I also ran ordered logit models, but the 
results are fairly similar so that we rather stick to the much simpler binary logit mod-
els. 
9   Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany (East), Germany 
(West), Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and United Kingdom. 
10  The situation is similar when sample size is kept constant. Results are available on 
request. 
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Table 3: Micro- and Macro-Level Determinants of Public Opinion 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Individual-level variables    
Gender -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.71) (1.32) (1.32) 
Age education -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (2.18)** (2.69)*** (2.69)*** 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (2.41)** (2.41)** (2.41)** 
Age^4 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (2.43)** (2.38)** (2.38)** 
Size of Community -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
 (5.92)*** (5.68)*** (5.68)*** 
Party member -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 
 (1.26) (0.74) (0.74) 
Unemployed in last 5 years? 0.22 0.24 0.24 
 (3.90)*** (4.10)*** (4.10)*** 
Social Environment    
Half of my friends are unemployed? 0.38 0.44 0.44 
 (4.96)*** (5.27)*** (5.27)*** 
Related Attitudes    
Necessary to have a good job? 0.08 0.07 0.07 
 (1.13) (1.03) (1.03) 
Workers don’t need strong trade  -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 
unions? (4.28)*** (5.28)*** (5.28)*** 
Foreigners shouldn’t work here? 0.05 0.03 0.03 
 (2.31)** (1.39) (1.39) 
Macro-level Covariates    
Employment Protection Legislation 1.45   
late ‘90s (17.52)***   
Unemployment Rate   0.02  
(avg. 1995-2000)  (1.48)  
Employment Rate    -0.10 
(avg. 1995-2000)   (17.45)*** 
Constant -2.51 1.00 8.22 
 (11.17)*** (3.47)*** (16.68)*** 
Observations      10881       10675      10675 
Number of country code      15      15      15 
Country fixed effects √ √ √ 
Log likelihood -6202.2952 -6023.3302 -6023.3302 
Dependent variable is belief in the trade-off in 2001(cf. text); absolute value of z statistics 
in parentheses, country fixed effects omitted 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
statement first increases slightly with age, but drops pronouncedly thereafter. 
Older people do not share the belief. The self-reported relative income position 
does not affect the likelihood of agreement, but this may be due to the crude op-
erationalization of the indicator. Being unemployed increases the probability of 
agreement by some three percent (model I), but this effect does not remain sig-
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nificant in the other models. The effect of having many unemployed friends re-
mains stable and increases the likelihood of agreeing by some eight percent – all 
else being equal.  
Other attitudinal variables perform as expected. Agreeing with a strong role for 
trade unions, also leads to agreeing with early retirement. Salience, measured by 
the importance of having a good job, also performs as expected. Job security is 
significant only in the last model, but bears the expected sign. Left-right position-
ing, however, does not seem to play a role in the pooled sample. Closer inspec-
tion of country regressions gives a more nuanced picture. In some cases, such 
as Germany or Ireland, it is more right-leaning voters who agree with the state-
ment, whereas in others, most notably Sweden and Italy, it is the political left. 
Opposing the immigration of foreign workers is clearly associated with a prefer-
ence for early retirement. In some countries, such as Eastern Germany and Aus-
tria, this effect is fairly strong. In the UK, however, the relationship is reversed so 
that those agreeing with immigration also agree with early retirement. As for the 
last group of indicators, approving a higher age of retirement decreases the likeli-
hood of agreement with early retirement. The situation is similar as regards the 
notion that ageing constitutes a major problem. No effect for duty could be found.  
All things considered, the data largely confirms the major hypotheses. Though 
personal situation clearly drives attitude towards early retirement, as expected by 
political economists, this is not enough. For instance, public opinion does not 
reveal a gender bias. Women hence seem to agree with a policy that has been 
predominantly designed for male workers. The socio-economic environment has 
a strong impact on the perception of the problem. Having many unemployed 
friends increases the likelihood of a person agreeing with the proposition. In my 
view the variable measures a social multiplier effect, i.e., a person’s opinion de-
pends on the situation of others. In fact, it seems to be more decisive to have 
many unemployed friends than to be unemployed yourself. It is also remarkable 
that there is no clear partisan bias, because it seems to depend on the national 
peculiarities of the political system. In Germany, for instance, it has frequently 
been argued that the Christian Democrats expanded early retirement drastically 
in the 1980s (Zohlnhöfer 2001), whereas Swedish conservatives opposed it 
(Ebbinghaus 2006). Adherents of trade unions universally agree with early exit, 
thus corroborating the literature on trade unions. The sole exception is Ireland, 
where those with positive opinions about trade unions reject the need for early 
retirement. Hence, the literature on social pacts seems to find its expression in 
the Irish case, but this may also be due to the fact that the business cycle in Ire-
land was much more favourable than in other countries. The fact that rejecting 
immigration and agreeing with early retirement go together strongly corroborates 
the thesis of a lump-of-labour belief. Of course, attitudes towards immigration 
reveal a great deal more than preferences for labour market policies. Neverthe-
less, immigration and increasing retirement age may be seen as two versions of 
the same policy attempt to increase the labour supply. People who see foreign 
immigrants as competitors also want to decrease competition between older and 
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younger workers. Finally, the dependent variable clearly relates to the stated pol-
icy preference on whether or not to postpone retirement age. The dependent 
variable therefore seems to be a reasonable proxy for the research question 
about EEPs. 
5. Some Tentative Findings on the Macro Level 
In the third section, I have hypothesized that aggregate indicators of national la-
bour markets should relate to belief in the trade-off. Countries that face higher 
rates of unemployment and higher rates of early exit also face higher rates of 
agreement, lower rates of disagreement and higher rates of uncertainty about the 
question. These labour market conditions may not be totally exogenous if the 
public discourse has any impact at all on economic conditions. More to the point, 
nobody would be very surprised by a correlation between the statement and un-
favourable labour market conditions. Hence, we need to dig a little deeper for 
potential macro-level determinants that reveal more than trivial information about 
the causes of beliefs. Empirically, I examine some of the correlates of country 
aggregates in greater detail to screen the potential causes of attitudes towards 
EEPs. Table 4 shows the correlates of the two Eurobarometer surveys with these 
potential causes. 
The first group is loosely labelled ‘structural conditions’ and concerns the struc-
tural indicators of the labour market. I have experimented with several indicators 
that are available on the macro-level, but show only the results for the overall 
employment rate, the rate of unemployment, as well as two five year averages of 
these two indicators. The second group is equally loosely labelled ‘political institu-
tions’ and contains some measures of policies and reforms. The first is the OECD 
index of overall employment protection legislation (OECD 2004). The second, 
AITR, shows a summary index for the year 2000 of the average implicit tax rates 
of older workers between 55 and 64 face when making their decision to retire. 
The index was constructed by Romain Duval (2003) and measures the material 
incentives to retire early measured as foregone pension or early retirement bene-
fits. A tax rate of zero implies that EEPs are actuarially neutral and the retirement 
decision should depend purely on individual preferences and circumstances. The 
other two indicators are also OECD-based and seek to measure a country’s effort 
to reform its labour market regulation (Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 2005). One is 
a summary index measuring the overall extent of reform between 1994 and 2003-
4, whereas the second focuses on reforming the transition of older workers in the 
same period.   
A look at Table 4, as well as the remaining correlations between indicators (not 
reported) leads to several major findings. As shown in the figure 1, unemploy-
ment and male employment rates of older workers correlate negatively. The cor- 
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Table 4: Correlates of Public Opinion 
 Should Make Way 
(1992) 
Should Make Way 
(2001) 
Socio-Economic Conditions   
Employment Rate, 55-64y, male 0.03 -0.35 
Employment Rate (both sexes), 
avg. 1995-2000 -0.50 -0.65** 
Unemployment Rate 0.35 0.56* 
Unemployment Rate, avg. 
1995-2000 0.19 0.35 
Political Institutions   
Overall Employment Protection 
Legislation, late ‘90s (OECD) 0.69* 0.90*** 
Average Implicit Tax Rate  
(Duval 2003) 0.09 0.24 
OECD Reform Index retirement -0.42 -0.21 
OECD Reform Index all fields -0.36 -0.56* 
Should Make Way 1992 1 0.67 
Source: Own calculations 
relation would also hold for the five year average rates between 1995 and 2000 
(not reported). Table 4 shows that the survey answers of 1992 and 2001 corre-
late, though not significantly due to the small number of observations (9). The 
strongest correlation I find is between the share of those agreeing to the state-
ment in 2001 and the extent of employment protection legislation in the late 
1990s. I have also plotted this relationship in Figure 2, which shows that there are 
virtually no outliers. Apart from that, aggregate agreement with the statement 
correlates positively with unemployment and negatively with average employment 
rates and the level of labour market reform.   
The interpretation of these correlations invites certain preliminary conclusions: 
The overall condition of a labour market, above all the recent evolution of em-
ployment, drives attitudes towards early retirement. Such a relationship has been 
shown before and is therefore not very controversial (Blekesaune and Quadagno 
2003;Svallfors 1997). The strong relationship between employment protection 
and public opinion requires more interpretation. A higher level of employment 
protection seems to induce more people to believe that the overall amount of jobs 
is limited. To be sure, employment protection legislation does not unequivocally 
drive the level of unemployment or employment rates, but it reduces turnover in 
the labour market and makes people more afraid about unemployment and job 
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security (OECD 2004).11 Hence, it is not far-fetched to presume that employment 
protection legislation also accelerates belief in the lump-of-labour fallacy. The 
higher the job protection the more difficult it becomes for an unemployed person 
to find a new (comparable) job and the more he or she will think that trade-offs 
dominate modern labour markets. The indicators of public opinion relate to indi-
cators of labour market reforms and EEP institutions. This relationship points in 
the expected direction, i.e., a stronger opinion about trade-offs goes hand in hand 
with less vigorous attempts to reform and higher incentives to retire. Though the 
relationship is not very strong in a statistical sense it is remarkable that no re-
verse effect is apparent, i.e., the level of labour market reform arouses a belief in 
a trade-off. This gives a measure of corroboration to the claim that beliefs matter 
in a causal sense and do not merely reflect current reform debates. 
We can now combine the micro and the macro levels of analysis. I follow the role 
of unemployment, employment, and employment protection as meaningful 
macro-level determinants of micro-level behaviour. From an econometric point of 
view, it is a logical extension of the micro model in Table 1 to control for macro- 
 
Figure 2:  The Relationship between Employment Protection and Public Opinion 
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11  Anderson and Pontuson develop a more nuanced stance on the link between em-
ployment protection legislation and personally felt insecurity. They find a significant 
relationship for job insecurity, but not for general labour market insecurity (Anderson 
and Pontusson 2007). 
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level determinants. This is what multi-level models do (Luke 2004). Instead of 
distinguishing between countries on the sole basis of fixed effects as in Table 2, I 
assume that there are macro-level variables directly imposing an impact on the 
average cross-country variation of micro-level determinants. I use this simple 
version, since I am interested only in the overall impact of macro-level variables 
and not in a specific interaction effect. Econometrically, I use a mixed-effects 
model, i.e., a combination of country fixed and random effects. Table 3 shows the 
results for the three different macro-variables and a set of micro-level determi-
nants that reiterates the model specification with model I in Table 2.  
By and large, the results of Table 3 replicate the findings of Table 2. Agreement 
with the statement is driven by age, size of community and personal and social 
experience with unemployment. Political factors do not play a direct role. The 
only, but quite remarkable difference between the two tables is that the link be-
tween attitudes towards foreigners and towards early retirement turns out to be 
fragile, once the macro-level variation in unemployment and employment rates is 
included (columns 3 and 4). It is also remarkable that unemployment does not 
seem to play an important role in itself. It is, by and large, accounted for on the 
micro- and meso-levels. On the contrary, the average employment performance 
of the last five years significantly contributes to explanations on the micro-level 
(column 4). The same for the role of employment protection. The multi-level 
analysis therefore reinforces the idea that institutional factors do play a role in 
how people perceive the functioning of labour markets. Higher employment pro-
tection explains some of the aggregate variation across countries. 
6. Conclusions 
In 1994 the Lubbers government was voted out of office, because it had frozen 
the level of public pensions. For the first time in 70 years, a coalition government 
formed without the participation of the Christian democrats. In contrast, the Ger-
man government of Helmut Kohl , which won by comfortable margins four gen-
eral elections in a row, shied away from a strong retrenchment in early retirement 
systems. Political economists are struggling with these facts, since they have 
problems explaining why EEPs arise in the first place and why they are not easier 
to retrench (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso 2003). Institutional accounts point to the 
role of specific institutional arrangements and their temporal persistence, but they 
sometimes allow for much leeway in the causal assumptions. The formation of 
voters’ beliefs is an important part of the puzzle and gives some insights into the 
dynamics of reform processes.  
Of course, this discussion paper has outlined only a first test which needs to be 
further developed at a later date. Yet, I have shown that people differ in how they 
perceive trade-offs between older and younger workers. These perceptions are 
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formed sociotrophically, i.e., respondents factor in not only personal experience, 
but also the experience of their surroundings. Moreover, their beliefs relate sys-
tematically to other beliefs about the necessity to limit competition in labour mar-
kets, for instance to protect workers against foreign labour. These findings are 
important empirical backing for the view that voters do not understand why poli-
cies designed to enhance the labour supply should be implemented in situations 
where labour markets perform badly. From an economist’s perspective, this might 
be an ironic tragedy, but, ultimately, reforming EEPs is a political not an eco-
nomic task.  
If these results survive further empirical tests, they will also teach an important 
lesson about the political feasibility of labour market reforms. In recent times, for 
instance, it has been argued that flexicurity is an important normative Leitbild or 
paradigm for labour market reform (Wilthagen 1998). Flexicurity means combin-
ing flexibility and turnover in the labour market with high benefit levels in the so-
cial security system to mitigate the negative consequences of becoming 
unemployed. So far this political programme has had little success outside Den-
mark. The reason, I think, lies in the fact that voters do not readily ‘buy into this 
story’. In times of high unemployment, voters rather think that flexicurity is all 
about flexibility and, quite paradoxically, less about security.  
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